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The Impact of Oportunidades on Human Capital and Income Distribution in 
Mexico: A Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approach
1
 
 
Dario Debowicz* and Jennifer Golan 
 
Abstract 
To analyze the effects of the Mexican Oportunidades conditional cash transfer program on 
school attendance and household income distribution, this paper links a microeconometric 
simulation model and a general equilibrium model in a bidirectional way, so to explicitly take 
spillover effects of the program into account. Our results suggest that partial equilibrium analysis 
alone underestimates the distributional effects of the program. Extending the coverage of the 
program to the poor increases school attendance, reduces child labor supply, and increases the 
equilibrium wages of children who remain at work. With a relatively low fiscal cost, Mexican 
social policy could further reduce income inequality and poverty.  
Keywords: computable general equilibrium (CGE); microsimulation; Oportunidades; child-
work; income inequality; poverty. 
JEL classification: O22; D31; D58.  
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1. Introduction 
The Oportunidades conditional cash transfer (CCT) program is estimated to transfer 14 billion Mexican 
pesos (Mexico, Ministry of Finance 2011), or 1.1 billion U.S. dollars, per year, reaching 5.8 million 
households (SEDESOL 2012) and representing a substantial source of income for the poor. As such, it is 
a major social program of the Mexican government. A successor to PROGRESA (Programa de 
Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion, the Education, Health and Nutrition Program), Oportunidades has 
attracted national and international attention (World Bank 2006). The program aims to develop the human 
capital of poor households (Skoufias 2005) by providing cash transfers under the condition that 
households behave consistently with the accumulation of human capital. The program has three 
components—education, nutrition, and health—with education the largest (Azevedo and Robles 2010). 
The program is operated by SEDESOL (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, the Social Development 
Secretariat) and seeks to eliminate the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Oportunidades cash 
transfers are individually delivered to the mothers of children of school age and vary depending on the 
number of children enrolled in school and their grade levels, and their attendance at health centers. All 
mothers participating in the program are informed with individually delivered pamphlets that the benefits 
of Oportunidades are not conditioned on participation in any political event or voting for any political 
party, and the rules of the program and the number of beneficiary families by locality, municipality, and 
state are available on the Internet
2
 and in the Federal Register (Levy 2006). 
Extensive evaluation of the program (Schultz 2004; Parker 2005; Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2005; 
Levy 2006) has led to a consensus that the program enhances welfare in several dimensions: nutrition 
(Attanazio and Angelucci 2009; Hoddinot, Skoufias, and Washburn 2003); health (Gertler 2004), and 
school attendance and incomes of the poor (Azevedo and Robles 2010).  
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Azevedo and Robles (2010) examine the effects of Oportunidades using the microsimulation model 
developed by Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) (BFL henceforth) to analyze the partial equilibrium 
effects of the transfers on children’s time allocation, relaxing its identifying assumption, and applying it 
to Oportunidades. They find that increasing school attendance for higher-grade-level students could be 
relatively expensive, while shifting the subsidies from children in primary education to students in 
advanced grades could raise overall school enrollment in Mexico with no additional cost for the program.  
However, national-scale CCTs in support of the poor can have important indirect general equilibrium 
effects. Only a combined macro-micro model is able to fully take these effects into account 
(Bourguignon, Bussolo, and Cockburn 2010). This paper analyzes the impact of the educational 
Oportunidades transfer on child labor supply, income distribution, and poverty by explicitly taking the 
program’s spillover effects into account. To our knowledge, this is the first study to link the BFL 
behavioral microsimulation model to a countrywide computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that 
considers the general equilibrium effects of the program. Using this integrated model and a comparative 
statics approach, our study takes a series of snapshots of observed and counterfactual scenarios in order to 
shed light on the effects of the Oportunidades program—effects that are actually perceived over time by 
the Mexican inhabitants. Ultimately, this paper hopes to contribute to the design of social policy by 
informing the decisionmaking process using a combined macro-micro model. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of relevant macro-micro modeling 
approaches. Section 3 develops a macro-micro model that explicitly captures CCTs and allows the macro 
and micro components of the model to communicate iteratively in a bidirectional way until converging on 
a joint equilibrium. Section 4 applies the combined macro-micro model to the Mexican Oportunidades 
program. The section also contrasts the general with the partial equilibrium effects of the program. The 
final section concludes.   
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2. The Interaction between Micro and Macro Models 
Macro- and microsimulation models can be linked in different ways. The link can be made by explicitly 
including selected micro behavior, typically labor supply or consumption demand, into a macro model 
(the integrated approach), so that a single model reflects relevant micro and macro behavior in the 
economy under analysis (Cogneau and Robilliard 2006; Cockburn 2006; Cockburn, Corong, and 
Cororaton 2010). Alternatively, the macro and the micro models can be “layered” in the sense that the 
two models are kept as different entities with some degree of communication between them. For instance, 
simulated percentage changes in factor wages may be endogenous in the macro model and communicated 
to the micro model, where wages are exogenous. In the layered approach, the microsimulation model can 
be behavioral, that is, it can reflect individuals’ behavior (the “layered behavioral approach”), or not (the 
“layered nonbehavioral approach”). Layered nonbehavioural models have been applied by Boccanfuso, 
Decaluwe, and Savard (2008), Vos and Sanchez (2010), and Herault (2010).  
In the layered behavioral approach, a functional form is specified for the selected behavior under analysis 
(for example, labor supply), and the parameters of the model are econometrically estimated. The 
behavioral approach has been applied in “top-down” and “top-down/bottom-up” fashion. In the top-down 
approach, the macro model informs the microsimulation model, but there is no feedback from the micro 
model to the macro model. Applications of this approach include Bourguignon, Robilliard, and Robinson 
(2004); and Debowicz (2010). In the top-down/bottom-up approach, first suggested by Savard (2003), the 
communication is bilateral and iterative, from the micro model to the macro model and from the macro 
model to the micro model. The basic idea of the top-down/bottom up approach is to use the household 
microsimulation model to capture the behavioral responses of households and the CGE model to generate 
a vector of commodity prices and factor wages equilibrating the associated markets, which are, in turn, 
communicated to the microsimulation model. In this case, the micro-household responses are aggregated 
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and fed back into the CGE model, which communicates in an iterative way with the microsimulation 
model until they converge on a joint equilibrium solution (Savard 2003; Cury et al. 2010).  
3. Model 
In the case of national-scale CCTs in support of the poor, where “the indirect general equilibrium effects 
are too significant to be dismissed,” a macro-micro approach is called for to analyze distributional 
impacts (Bourguignon, Bussolo, and Cockburn 2010, 1). Since one of the main goals of the 
Oportunidades program is to increase human capital by raising school attendance, this transmission 
channel needs to be taken into account when modeling the distributional impact of the program. In order 
to capture how changes in the allocation of children’s time lead to general equilibrium effects at the 
national level, which again affect children’s time allocation, the micro model needs to communicate to the 
macro model and vice versa. 
The combined model must capture two main transmission channels: 
1. Occupational effect: Changes in the coverage of the program, in the program design, or in child 
wages lead some households to reallocate the time of their children between school and work. This 
affects labor supply as well as transfer income and thus total disposable household income.  
2. Wage effect: As some children withdraw from (or enter into) the labor market—in response to 
changes in the program design or other factors—the child labor supply falls (rises), excess demand 
(supply) for child labor will be generated, and, through the equilibrium of the child labor market, the 
average general equilibrium real wage that children who remain at work are able to receive will rise 
(fall), with an additional effect on total disposable household income.  
While direct effects of changes in the program design on occupation can be captured by a 
microsimulation model, in order to capture the wage effect we need to link the microsimulation model to 
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a macrosimulation model. The combined model should also account for the effect of the transfers on the 
fiscal balance and for the effect of changes in child labor supply on production. The IFPRI (International 
Food Policy Research Institute) Standard CGE Model satisfies these requirements. 
The model developed in this paper contributes to linking microsimulations to macroeconomic CGE 
models in the context of a CCT program. Our combined model allows the identification of the expected 
direct and indirect effects of the CCTs on children’s time allocation, as well as the contemporaneous 
expected effects on income distribution and poverty.  
Our model combines a microsimulation model with a macro CGE model using the top-down/bottom-up 
methodology developed by Savard (2003). The microsimulation model closely follows Bourguignon, 
Ferreira, and Leite’s (2003) model. The macro model is based on the IFPRI Standard CGE Model (Diao, 
et al. 2011), a model that captures relevant characteristics of developing economies and allows to track 
the effects of a variety of counterfactual scenarios on the commodity and factor markets and the income 
distribution of a countrywide economy.  
Our study is in line with Cury et al. (2010), who also use a top-down/bottom-up macro-micro model and 
apply it to a cash transfer program (Bolsa Familia in Brazil). The model used in their study does not 
capture how the conditionality of the transfers affects children’s school attendance. Our microsimulation 
model explicitly captures the effect of conditionality on the time allocation of potential beneficiary 
children.  
Several recent micro-empirical studies analyze indirect effects of CCT programs using ex post evaluation 
methods (Angelucci and De Giorgi (2008), Alzúa, Cruces, and Ripani (2012), Skoufias and di Maro 
(2006), Skoufias and Parker (2001), Gertler, Martinez, and Rubio-Codina (2012)). Our work 
complements these studies in various ways. First, we are using an ex ante evaluation technique at the 
micro level that allows us to explore the impact of potential changes to the program design, which would 
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not be possible with an ex post technique. Second, in linking the BFL and IFPRI models bidirectionally, 
we fully take into account the effects of the conditional transfers on children’s time allocation and 
household income, the subsequent effects on the factor and commodity markets, and the continuous 
feedback from the countrywide markets to households’ behavior and incomes. In our model, the child and 
adult labor markets are interlinked. Child labor is only imperfectly substitutable with other factors, so 
potential changes in the program design significantly affect the child labor market-clearing wage without 
substantially altering the total production of the economy, given the small contribution of child labor to 
national income. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, we link the IFPRI and BFL models iteratively in the 
following way:  
1. Changes in the design of the Oportunidades transfers are transmitted to both the macroeconomic 
CGE and the microsimulation model—the former at the representative household level and the 
latter at the sampled individual level. 
2. The microsimulation model generates a childwise time allocation between school and work and 
communicates it in an aggregated way, as a percentage change in the supply of child labor, to the 
CGE model, where the child labor supply is treated as exogenous. 
3. The CGE model generates a new general equilibrium solution and transmits the percentage 
changes in the average wage of the children (𝑤𝐶𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐷) and in other household incomes (𝑌−𝑖), to 
the microsimulation model, where these variables are exogenous. 
4. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated iteratively in a loop until the two models converge on a joint solution 
and the economy reaches a new equilibrium in all its factor and commodity markets. 
Figure 3.1—Modeling Oportunidades conditional cash transfers (CCTs): Our modeling approach 
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Source: authors’ elaboration based on transmission channels in the macro-micro model. 
Microsimulation Model 
We adapt the methodology of BFL to the case of Oportunidades. In this model, each child 𝑖 chooses 
among the following occupational alternatives (𝑗): work (j = 0), work and attend school (j = 1), and attend 
school (j = 2). Child 𝑖 will take occupational choice 𝑘 if and only if the utility of alternative 𝑘 exceeds 
that of the other alternatives 𝑗:  
𝑂𝑖 = 𝑘  iff  𝑈𝑖(𝑘) > 𝑈𝑖(𝑗) for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. (1) 
The utility of each alternative is composed of a deterministic (𝐹𝑗(. )) and a random component (𝑣𝑖𝑗) that 
reflects unobservable characteristics affecting occupational choice (Amemiya and Shimono 1989). The 
deterministic component of occupational choice depends on child-specific characteristics (𝐶𝑖), such as 
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age, and household-specific characteristics (𝐻𝑖), as well as the sum of the choice-specific income of the 
child (𝑦𝑖𝑗) and other income of the household (𝑌−𝑖): 
𝑈𝑖(𝑗) = 𝐹𝑗(𝐶𝑖, 𝐻𝑖; 𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝑌−𝑖) + 𝑣𝑖𝑗 . (2) 
Linearizing the utility function and collecting all nonincome covariates into a single vector (𝑍𝑖), we can 
rewrite the latent utility function of choice 𝑗 as 
𝑈𝑖(𝑗) = 𝑍𝑖′𝛾𝑗  + (𝑌−𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖𝑗)  𝛼𝑗   + 𝑣𝑖𝑗 . (3) 
The child’s contribution to overall household income, 𝑦𝑖𝑗, is a function of the market wage, 𝑤𝑖. For 
children in alternative 0 who work in the market and help at home—for example, by helping in the 
preparation of goods to be sold in a family business or on domestic tasks that may release time other 
household members can spend on income-generating activities—𝑤𝑖 would underestimate the children’s 
contribution to overall household income 𝑦𝑖0. A way to account for the child’s domestic contribution to 
overall household income is to multiply the market income by a constant (𝐾), so that 𝑦𝑖0 = 𝐾𝑤𝑖. If 𝐾 > 1, 
the child’s contribution to overall household income exceeds the market income. Given the absence of 
relevant data to proceed otherwise, we assume that children working in the market and not attending 
school do not contribute to domestic activities and that their contribution to overall household income is 
equal to their market wage (that is, K = 1), so that: 
𝑦𝑖0 = 𝑤𝑖. (4) 
For a child working and going to school, his remuneration in the labor market is likely to be below what 
he would receive if he were only to work, because he spends less time working in the market. To capture 
how child-specific characteristics and occupational choices affect market wages, we assume that the wage 
is a log-linear function of child-specific characteristics 𝑋𝑖, of a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if 
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the child is working and attending school, 𝑂𝑖1 = 1, and of unobservable child or household specific 
characteristics (𝑢𝑖): 
𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖
′ 𝛿 + 𝑚𝑂𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖, (5) 
with j = 0,1. The coefficient 𝑚 captures the effect on market earnings of children working less than full-
time. Accordingly, 𝑀 = 𝑒𝑚 captures the fraction of the market income that the child receives after this 
reduction. The income contribution of choosing alternative 1 is thus defined as 
𝑦𝑖1 = 𝑀𝑦𝑖0 = 𝑀𝑤𝑖. (6) 
A child only going to school is likely to contribute only a fraction (D) of the income she could earn in the 
market working full-time, as attending school does not yield any immediate economic returns to the 
household and she can only help at home when not attending school: 
𝑦𝑖2 = 𝐷𝑦𝑖0 = 𝐷𝑤𝑖. (7) 
Rewriting the utility function in terms of the market wage (𝑤𝑖) to allow the determinants of occupational 
choice to be common to the available occupational choices yields: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑗) = 𝑍′𝑖𝛾𝑗 + 𝑌−𝑖𝛼𝑗 + 𝑤𝑖𝛽𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗, (8) 
where  
𝛽0 = 𝛼0, (9) 
𝛽1 = 𝛼1𝑀, and (10) 
𝛽2 = 𝛼2𝐷. (11) 
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Data and Parameter Estimation 
The data we use come from the Mexican Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 
(ENIGH, the National Household Income and Expenditure Survey) 2008, provided by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Geografia (INEGI, the National Institute of Statistics and Geography). ENIGH 
2008 is a national representative household survey that includes information on labor and other factor 
earnings, transfers, and consumption and allows the identification of households that participate in 
Oportunidades. The survey asks household members about their nonlabor income sources, and it notes 
whether any child receives a scholarship from the program. This allows us to construct a measure of the 
scholarship component of the program using the program rules
3
.  
Our analysis concentrates on children aged 6 to 17. If a child is not attending school we classify her into 
occupational alternative 0 (“Work”), if he attends school but also reports a wage into category 1 (“Work 
and School”) and if he only attends school into category 2 (“School”). We find that out of a total of 26.9 
millions of children, 3.2 million (11.8%) of them only work, and 1.4 million (5.3%) of them work and 
study, with the remaining 82.9% only studying. While most of the children study and do not work, the 
occupational composition varies significantly by age group: around age 12, the choice composition shifts 
toward increased labor market participation, and the percentage of children who do not attend school 
increases (not tabulated, see also Azevedo and Robles 2010).   
For the microsimulation model, we need to estimate potential wages for those who do not report a wage. 
Prior to estimation, we convert all the income figures into monthly thousands of Mexican pesos. Table 3.1 
summarizes the results of the estimation of Equation (5) by ordinary least squares (OLS). Column 1 
reports the results for all children and Column 2 for those aged 12 and above. We find that, controlling for 
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observable characteristics, children who go to school and work earn 64 percent less income than those 
who only work. Accordingly, our parameter estimate of M is M = exp(-0.644) = 0.525.  
In the next step, we estimate a multinomial logit model (MNL) to explain children’s occupational choice. 
We choose “Work” as the base category in the analysis that follows. The results of the MNL are 
summarized in Table 3.2. The signs of the estimates are as expected. Increasing household income 
increases the likelihood of studying, as it increases the probability of choosing alternative 1 or 2 relative 
to alternative 0. We also find intrahousehold difficulties, as captured by a divorce of the household head, 
to decrease the probability of studying and that increasing (potential) wages reduces the likelihood of 
studying relative to working.  
Once the wage and the occupational choice equations have been estimated, the parameters and initial 
values of the microsimulation model can be determined. The conditional cash transfer, 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑗, raises other 
household income 𝑌−𝑖 of school attendants (alternatives 1 and 2). Assuming that children not attending 
school receive no transfer, and each school attendant receives a transfer (𝑇𝑖) that varies by age and 
gender, then 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖0 = 0 and 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖1 = 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖2 = 𝑇𝑖, Equation (8) can be rewritten as 
𝑈𝑖(𝑗) = 𝑍𝑖𝛾𝑗 + (𝑌−𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑗)𝛼𝑗 + 𝑤𝑖𝛽𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗  with 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖0 = 0 and 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖1 = 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖2 = 𝑇𝑖. (12) 
The MNL allows identifying (𝛾𝑗 − 𝛾0), (𝛼𝑗 − 𝛼0), (𝛽𝑗 − 𝛽0) for nonalternative specific covariates. 
Following BFL, and using the OLS parameter estimate of M and Equations (9) to (11), we can recover 
𝛼𝑗, 𝛽𝑗,and 𝛾𝑗 for 𝑗 = 0,1,2. Our parameter estimates of household income 𝑌−𝑖 in alternatives 1 and 2 are 
𝑎1 = α1 − α0 = 0.019 and 𝑎2 = α2 − α0 = 0.022, respectively. M = 0.5254, and our estimates of 
potential wages in alternatives 1 and 2 are 𝑏1 = β1 − β0 = −0.416 and 𝑏2 = β2 − β0 = −0.062,  
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Table 3.1—Ordinary least squares (OLS) child earnings estimates  
Dependent variable: log wage 
  6 to 17 years old 12 to 17 years old 
Work and school  -0.644*** -0.593*** 
  (0.060) (0.058) 
Years of schooling 0.009 0.153*** 
  (0.044) (0.047) 
Years of schooling^2 -0.001 -0.012*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.389*** 0.366 
  (0.090) (0.334) 
Age^2 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.011) 
Male 0.214*** 0.213*** 
  (0.048) (0.053) 
Female head 0.135*** 0.127** 
  (0.052) (0.056) 
Rural -0.243*** -0.326*** 
  (0.051) (0.054) 
Log state wages 0.346*** 0.438*** 
  (0.064) (0.072) 
Noreste region 0.219 0.096 
  (0.152) (0.166) 
Noroeste region 0.306*** 0.337*** 
  (0.100) (0.108) 
Occidente region 0.151 0.167 
  (0.103) (0.111) 
Oriente region -0.062 0.053 
  (0.112) (0.115) 
Centronorte region 0.122 0.110 
  (0.099) (0.104) 
Centrosur region 0.178* 0.206** 
  (0.101) (0.105) 
Sureste region -0.023 0.141 
  (0.100) (0.107) 
Constant -5.882*** -5.086** 
  (0.528) (2.484) 
Observations 3,021 2,285 
R-squared 0.596 0.262 
Source: authors’ estimation based on ENIGH 2008.  
Note: standard errors in parentheses. *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05,***: p < 0.01. 
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Table 3.2—Multinomial logit regression of children’s time allocation, all children 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Work & School School only Work Work & School School only
Potential wage -0.416*** -0.062*** 0.005*** -0.016*** 0.011***
(0.035) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of schooling 0.000 -0.093*** 0.006*** 0.004*** -0.010***
(0.037) (0.025) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Years of schooling^2 0.008** -0.002 0.000 0.000*** -0.000***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. children 0≤age≤5 -0.058 -0.122*** 0.008*** 0.002 -0.010***
(0.042) (0.026) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. children 6≤age≤12 0.297*** 0.289*** -0.018*** 0.001 0.017***
(0.034) (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
No. children 13≤age≤17 -0.613*** -0.705*** 0.044*** 0.002 -0.046***
(0.043) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. people age≥18 -0.278*** -0.240*** 0.015*** -0.002* -0.013***
(0.034) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Male 0.493*** -0.206*** 0.011*** 0.031*** -0.042***
(0.063) (0.040) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Rank of child 0.355*** 0.396*** -0.025*** -0.001 0.026***
(0.036) (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Other household income 0.019*** 0.022*** -0.001*** -0.000 0.001***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Educatio head 0.101*** 0.169*** -0.011*** -0.002*** 0.013***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Age head 0.006* 0.019*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.002***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head divorced -0.137 -0.321*** 0.022*** 0.008* -0.030***
(0.108) (0.071) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Rural -0.412*** -0.211*** 0.015*** -0.009*** -0.005
(0.073) (0.045) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Log state wages 0.411*** -0.157*** 0.008** 0.025*** -0.033***
(0.089) (0.054) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Noreste region -0.160 -0.289** 0.020** 0.005 -0.025**
(0.205) (0.115) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Noroeste region 0.618*** 0.076 -0.007 0.029*** -0.023***
(0.135) (0.082) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Occidente region 0.371*** -0.153* 0.008 0.027*** -0.035***
(0.144) (0.087) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Oriente region 0.253 0.171* -0.010** 0.004 0.006
(0.154) (0.090) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Centronorte region 0.112 -0.068 0.004 0.008 -0.012
(0.138) (0.080) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Centrosur region 0.042 0.153* -0.009* -0.004 0.013*
(0.140) (0.080) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Sureste region 0.631*** 0.108 -0.008* 0.029*** -0.020**
(0.136) (0.081) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant -0.736** 0.821***
(0.332) (0.205)
Observations 30,331 30,331 30,331 30,331 30,331
Coefficients Marginal  effects 
 
Source: authors’ estimation based on ENIGH 2008. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01. 
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respectively. Solving for the parameters of interest yields 𝛼1 = (𝑎1 − 𝑏1)/ (1 − 𝑀) = 0.9158, 𝛼2 =
𝛼1 + 𝑎2 − 𝑎1 = 0.9188, 𝛼0 = 𝛼2 − 𝑎2 = 0.8968, and 𝐷 = (𝑏2 + 𝛼0)/ 𝛼2 = 0.9089. 
Once the elements in the deterministic part of the utility function are identified, and assuming for 
convenience that Ui(0) = 0, we draw the unobservables 𝑣𝑖𝑗 − 𝑣𝑖0 randomly from an MNL distribution, 
assuring consistency with the observed child’s occupational choices. The determinants of the latent utility 
are identified for each child and occupational choice, and the utility function allows the simulation of 
child labor supply responses to changes in the design of CCTs or changes in other determinants of utility 
such as children’s wages or other household income.  
Computable General Equilibrium Model  
Following general equilibrium theory, representative consumers (households) and producers in our model 
are treated as individual economic agents. Households maximize a Stone-Geary utility function, such that 
their consumer behavior is driven by a linear expenditure system (LES) taking income and commodity 
prices as given. Sector-specific producers have a CES value-added function with arguments given by 
child labor, other labor, capital, and land, and choose factor inputs to maximize their expected profits 
assuming wages and prices are given.  
Import and export world prices are given for domestic agents. Domestically produced goods, imports, and 
exports are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. Imports are determined to minimize the cost of domestic 
absorption given import and domestic prices, and exports are determined to maximize producers’ profit 
given export and domestic prices. Commodity-specific domestic price changes equilibrate the commodity 
markets, and factor-specific wage changes equilibrate the factor markets. Households’ incomes are the 
sum of factor and nonfactor (Oportunidades and other transfer) income. 
Regarding macroeconomic closures, the model has (1) savings-driven investment with exogenous 
marginal propensities to save for the households and endogenous investment, (2) exogenous public 
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expenditures and tax rates with endogenous public savings, and (3) exogenous foreign savings with an 
endogenous real exchange rate. The numeraire of the model is given by the consumer price index (CPI).  
The Mexican CGE model includes 14 sector-specific producers, 15 production factors, 16 representative 
household groups, and 10 other accounts (including the Oportunidades program). Child labor is a specific 
production factor, and the rest of labor is categorized into production factors according to gender, skill 
level, and formal or informal status. Households are classified according to poverty status, region, gender 
of the household head, and whether they initially benefit from the Oportunidades program.  
The parameters of the model are calibrated in light of factor use informed by analysis of ENIGH 
microdata; the social accounting matrix (SAM) was especially prepared for our study and captures the 
Oportunidades transfers
4
; and production, trade, and consumption elasticities present in previous CGE 
analysis of PROGRESA CCTs in Mexico by Coady and Harris (2001). The factor demand is assumed to 
be inelastic, with a CES factor substitution elasticity of 0.6, for which we conduct sensitivity analysis 
given its centrality for the analysis at stake. We find that our results do not hinge on the elasticity of 
substitution among factor inputs assumed in the model
5
. Imports and exports are elastic, with Armington 
and CET elasticities taking values between 2 and 4 (4 for agriculture, livestock, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting; 3 for mining, electricity, water and gas provision, construction, manufacturing, trade, transport, 
mail, and storage; and 2 for the remaining activities). The income elasticity in the LES household 
consumption of commodities is lower for primary goods (0.8) than for industrial goods (1.0) and even 
lower than for services (1.2), and the Frisch parameter is unitary. 
Counterfactual Scenarios to Analyze the Program Effects on Schooling, 
Income Distribution, and Poverty  
                                                          
4
 The SAM is available with full documentation at www.ifpri.org/dataset/2008-social-accounting-matrix-mexico. 
5
 Results are available from the corresponding author upon request.  
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To evaluate the short- and long-term effects of the Oportunidades program, starting from a base scenario 
in which we observe Oportunidades transfers received by households in the ENIGH 2008 household 
survey, we analyze the following three counterfactual scenarios.  
In the first scenario (“No Program”), we simulate the absence of all Oportunidades (conditional and 
unconditional) transfers. In comparison to the benchmark scenario, in which the program is in operation 
under the present rules, this scenario allows us to estimate the effects that the actual program is having on 
schooling, income distribution, and poverty.  
In the second scenario (“Program Expansion”), we extend the coverage of the conditional transfers to all 
the moderately poor children, applying the existent rule for the amount transferred as a function of grade 
and gender. This means that any existent transfer is left unchanged, but the coverage of the available CCT 
is further expanded, with 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖 = 𝑓(school grade, gender) for the moderately poor who initially are not 
CCT recipients. For children who are not attending school, we design the CCT according to their gender 
and the school grade they would be attending if they were to attend school, given their latest schooling 
level and grade completed.  
The third and final scenario (“Program Skilling”) accounts for the lagged human capital effect of the 
existing transfers. In particular, we model that Oportunidades increases the average years of schooling of 
the child population and contributes to increasing the skills of the future workforce, particularly of the 
households benefitting from the program. We model the lagged human capital effect of the program in a 
very simple way, assuming that the closest child projection into the future is, where available, the child’s 
same-gender parent (see McKee and Todd (2009) for a more elaborate application with a different 
dataset). The program has been found to increase the years of schooling by an additional 0.72 and 0.64 
years for girls and boys, respectively (Skoufias 2005). Building on this finding, we add the assumed 
increment in schooling to the observed years of schooling of each matched parent and round it to a new 
integer level, generating an adult labor force with a new education structure. We use the resulting measure 
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of schooling to reclassify adults by skill category (unskilled, semiskilled, and skilled). We then simulate 
the general equilibrium effects of the change in the education structure of the adult labor force
6
. For this, 
we use the associated percentage changes in gender-specific adult labor supply by skill level to inform the 
exogenous labor supply parameter of our static CGE model and compare a simulated snapshot using the 
new adult labor force with the initially observed one. We account for the changes in child and adult 
wages, and the changed incentives of going to school once the postschool wage has fallen for more 
educated workers given the increase in their supply due to the program.  
For each of the three counterfactual scenarios, we translate the simulated changes in the Oportunidades 
transfer and lagged human capital, and the resulting changes in earnings, into changes in income at the 
level of the observed households, and compute population-weighted changes in school attendance, 
household income, poverty indicators, and the Gini index considering both partial equilibrium (for the 
first two simulations) and general equilibrium (for all simulations) effects.  
While the first two simulations focus on the contemporaneous partial and general equilibrium 
distributional effects, the last simulation focuses on the distributional effects that the existing program 
may have at some point in the future where the effects of the program on the skill composition of the 
adult labor force have been fully developed, and the program remains in operation with the existing 
characteristics, albeit not in a dynamic way.  
In principle, there could be significant program effects in the short term on the level of social production 
and the fiscal balance. Given the small share of child labor income in national income, and the small share 
of Oportunidades transfers in the total expenditure of the Mexican government, these effects turn out not 
to be first-order effects as, for example, extending the program to all the moderately poor increases public 
expenditure by only 1.3%. If the Oportunidades program leads more children to attend school, the 
                                                          
6
 For an interesting analysis of how the effects of increasing education on the economy depend on the level of 
physical investment, see Jung and Thorbecke (2003). 
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government will probably need to increase spending on public education to maintain educational quality. 
Our model can only capture public expenditure increments that are directly linked to the program.  
School Attendance 
Table 4.1 reports changes in the time allocation of children associated with the different counterfactual 
scenarios. The table is organized as a transition matrix: the columns depict the original occupational 
choices and the rows the simulated choices generated by the partial equilibrium (first three columns) and 
general equilibrium (last three columns) effects. The table shows that the effect on time allocation of 
withdrawing all Oportunidades transfers (“No Program”) is very small, both ignoring and factoring in the 
general equilibrium effects of the program. Ignoring general equilibrium effects, only 0.1 percent of those 
initially only attending school, and 0.3 percent of those originally combining work with school, drop out 
of school. Incorporating general equilibrium effects, the additional child labor supply allows the economy 
to increase its output marginally in the short run,
7
 lifting some households’ income, and so some 
households (0.1 percent of those originally combining work and school—in other words, an insignificant 
0.003 percent of the total children) stop sending their children to work. In partial equilibrium, extending 
the program to all the children in moderately poor households (“Program Expansion”) does lead to a 
substantial increase in school enrollment: 12.6 percent of the children who initially were out of school 
enroll, and 11.8 percent leave the labor market. 
Table 4.1—Transition matrix for time allocation of children by simulation and type of equilibrium 
No Program:                  Partial Equilibrium General Equilibrium 
 
Base Choice Base Choice 
Simulated Choice 
Not  
Studying 
Work  
and  
School 
School  
Only 
Not  
Studying 
Work  
and  
School 
School  
Only 
Not Studying 100.0 0.3 0.1 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Work and School 0.0 99.7 0.0 0.0 99.9 0.0 
School Only 0.0 0.0 99.9 0.0 0.1 100.0 
                                                          
7
 The effect on the child labor wage proves to be negligible.  
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Program Expansion:        
Simulated Choice       
Not Studying 87.4 0.0 0.0 87.9 0.5 0.1 
Work and School 0.8 100.0 0.0 0.5 96.4 0.0 
School Only 11.8 0.0 100.0 11.6 3.1 99.9 
Program Skilling:           
Simulated Choice       
Not Studying -- -- -- 99.8 0.0 0.0 
Work and School -- -- -- 0.0 99.9 0.0 
School Only -- -- -- 0.2 0.1 100.0 
       
Source: authors’ calculation based on ENIGH 2008 and model results. 
The significant change in child labor supply generated by the expansion of the program is not inconsistent 
with the small change in labor supply generated by the withdrawal of the program, as a significant 
number of children are in the benchmark only marginally included in the “Work” alternative; in other 
words, their observable and unobservable characteristics are such that a slight increase in the 
attractiveness of the school alternative make them enter school. This translates into a 1.5 percentage point 
increase in the overall school attendance rate, given that the initial figure of children out of school is 11.8 
percent (Table 3.2). The effect varies by gender (not tabulated): 1.1 percent of boys who were initially 
working now also go to school and 11.1 percent go to school only; only 0.3 percent of girls initially 
working now also go to school and 12.7 percent stop working to attend school.   
When we account for the general equilibrium effects of the program, the extension of the coverage has 
two conceptually different effects. As in partial equilibrium, some children return to school, attracted by 
the CCT. On top of this schooling effect, more children attending school implies a measurable reduction 
in child labor supply—of around 12 percent—(occupational effect), which, in turn, leads to an 
equilibrating rise in the average earnings of children, of 17.8 percent (wage effect). These results are 
robust to a range of different substitution elasticities among factors in the production functions of the 
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CGE model
8
. By raising the opportunity cost of schooling, increases in wages ultimately make attending 
school unintentionally less attractive. The results of the combined macro-micro model on time 
allocation—summarized in the central part of the table—indicate the presence of two competing forces. 
First, the transfer increases the attractiveness to households of sending the children to school (given α2 > 
α1 > α0 > 0). Second, a wage effect indirectly generated by the program works in the opposite direction, 
driving households to send children to work (as b1,b2 < 0).  
While we find that the wage effect leads some children to drop out of school, the magnitude turns out to 
be insignificant, generating ceteris paribus a drop in the attendance rate of less than 0.1 percent, as 0.5 
percent of those originally working and studying and 0.1 percent of those originally only studying leave 
school. For most of the children, the direct occupational effect of Oportunidades on time allocation more 
than offsets the indirect wage effect: 12.1 percent of those initially not studying start going to school, and 
3.1 percent of those originally combining work with school stop working to only study. Overall, we find 
that in general equilibrium an eventual expansion of the coverage of the program would increase the 
attendance rate by 1.4 percentage points. This finding is only slightly below the 1.5 percentage point 
increase in school attendance predicted by the partial equilibrium model.  
The lagged skilling effect of the Oportunidades program (“Program Skilling”) operates through changes 
in the productivity of the labor force and changes in the real wage in the adult labor market, reducing the 
adult skill premium but increasing the wages of those who acquire skills, as discussed in more detail 
below. The transition matrix is close to an identity matrix, reflecting that the future change in the skill 
composition of the adult labor force is not expected to affect the future time allocation of the children in a 
significant way.  
Poverty and Income Distribution  
                                                          
8
 We repeated the analysis with factor substitution elasticities of 0.4 and 0.8, finding very similar results.  
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Given the progressive design of the program, the contemporaneous and lagged impacts of the program on 
income distribution are also progressive, as illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The figures show the 
percentage changes in household income for each centile of adult equivalent income due to the program. 
In the figures, we order households from poor to rich in terms of adult equivalent income. The different 
lines in the figure illustrate the simulated impacts on each centile of the income distribution. If a line were 
to coincide with the horizontal axis, the simulation is not estimated to alter the income distribution. The 
shape of the depicted lines suggests that the effect on income is substantial for the poorest households but 
converges towards zero for households at the top of the income distribution. Dropping the program 
reduces the average income of the poorest households by 23 percent, while extending the program to all 
the moderately poor increases incomes by 34 percent, a result of the combination of the increase in the 
number of poor households receiving the transfer and the positive wage effect benefitting those who keep 
their children at work. By increasing the future human capital stock of beneficiary households (“Program 
Skilling”), poor households benefit in two ways. The poor households that increase their human capital 
benefit directly (given the positive skill premium in the new equilibrium), and the poor household 
members who remain unskilled also benefit due to the increase in the relative scarcity of unskilled labor 
in the new equilibrium due to the program. Combining these effects, the program raises the average 
income of the poorest households by around 23 percent.  
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Figure 4.1—Change in household per adult equivalent income by centile, no-program and program-
expansion simulations, partial and general equilibrium.  
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on model results. 
Figure 4.2—Change in household per adult equivalent income by percentile, program-skilling simulation, 
general equilibrium Source: authors’ calculation based on model results. 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on model results. 
 Figure 4.1 suggests that the simulated program effects are more pronounced when accounting for the 
general equilibrium effects of the program. The figure shows that the lines generated by the general 
equilibrium model are further away from the horizontal axis than those in the partial equilibrium model. 
An extension of the coverage of the program not only increases the income of beneficiary households but 
indirectly also increases the marginal productivity and the real wage of child labor in Mexico (wage 
effect), raising the incomes of the households who keep their children at work. Withdrawing the program 
would not only generate a direct reduction in household incomes, but by increasing child labor supply and 
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reducing the equilibrium child wages (negative wage effect), it would further reduce the incomes of the 
poor. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the effect of the program on different poverty measures using the national moderate 
and extreme poverty lines provided by the Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Politica del Desarrollo 
Social (CONEVAL, the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy) for rural and 
urban areas, and household adult equivalent incomes (Teruel, Rubalcava, and Santana 2005). The table 
also summarizes poverty in terms of poverty lines set at US$1.25 and US$2 per day. We use the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factor provided by the World Bank (2011) to convert the 
national figures into international terms. While international poverty measures using the US$1.25- and 
US$2-a-day poverty lines are close to our base estimates (World Bank 2011), the national figures deviate. 
This may be because of differences in the aggregation methodology, for instance, or the use of 
consumption as opposed to income. Our average quarterly incomes are, however, very close to those 
reported in official documents using ENIGH 2008, at 36,325 Mexican pesos compared to 36,694 (INEGI 
2009).  
Table 4.2—Simulated poverty and inequality indicators by simulation and type of equilibrium  
Indicator Base 
No  
Program 
Program 
Expansion 
Program 
Skilling 
FGT(0)   Partial General Partial General General 
National extreme poverty line 6.7 8.3 8.9 5.7 5.3 5.8 
National moderate poverty line 29.2 30.3 31.1 27.4 26.5 27.8 
US$1.25-a-day line 1.7 2.8 3.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 
US$2-a-day line 5.2 6.6 7.0 4.4 4.0 4.4 
FGT(1)             
National extreme poverty line 1.9 2.7 2.9 1.5 1.3 1.5 
National moderate poverty line 9.9 11.0 11.5 9.0 8.5 9.0 
US$1.25-a-day line 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 
US$2-a-day line 1.5 2.3 2.5 1.2 1.1 1.2 
FGT(2)             
National extreme poverty line 0.8 1.3 1.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 
National moderate poverty line 4.8 5.7 6.0 4.2 3.9 4.2 
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US$1.25-a-day line 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
US$2-a-day line 0.6 1.1 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Gini  0.512 0.520 0.521 0.506 0.501 0.504 
       
Source: authors’ calculation based on ENIGH 2008 and model results. 
The results are consistent with our previous findings and also suggest larger effects in general equilibrium 
than in partial equilibrium: withdrawing the program increases the poverty rate by 1.1 (US$1.25-a-day 
poverty line) to 1.6 (national extreme poverty line) percentage points in partial equilibrium, and by 1.8 to 
2.2 percentage points in general equilibrium. Expanding the program to all the moderately poor is 
estimated to significantly reduce the poverty rate, by 1.8 (partial equilibrium) or 2.7 (general equilibrium) 
percentage points in the case of the national moderate poverty line. Accounting for the lagged human 
capital effect of the program yields a lagged reduction in the poverty rate of an additional 1.4 percentage 
points. The table also suggests that poverty incidence, poverty severity, and inequality also decrease 
significantly with the program, both in the present and in the future, independently of the measure chosen. 
Finally, withdrawing the program increases the Gini coefficient from 0.512 to 0.520 (partial equilibrium) 
or 0.521 (general equilibrium), while increasing the availability of the program to all the moderately poor 
allows it to drop to 0.506 (partial equilibrium) or 0.501 (general equilibrium). Increasing the skills of the 
future workforce reduces inequality to 0.504.  
4. Conclusions 
National-scale CCT programs in support of the poor can have significant indirect general equilibrium 
effects. Only a combined macro-micro modeling approach is able to take these effects fully into account 
when estimating the economic impact of this type of program. This paper combines a microsimulation 
model with a general equilibrium model, both of which are well established, and solves for an equilibrium 
that jointly satisfies the utility-maximizing decisions regarding children’s time allocation and the 
equilibrium of the countrywide factor and commodity markets. Applying the combined model to the 
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Oportunidades CCT program in Mexico, we find that the program improves household income 
distribution and poverty indicators in Mexico, and that an extension of the coverage of the program to all 
moderately poor households could improve these indicators further. Our results suggest that disregarding 
general equilibrium effects, which is typically the case in program evaluation, may underestimate the 
distributional effects of the Oportunidades program, and similar types of programs (as appropriate 
recalibration of the parameters of the model allows its application to other national-level CCT programs 
in developing countries).  In particular, we find that by raising the opportunity cost of work through the 
provision of transfers conditional on school attendance, an expansion of the Oportunidades educational 
transfer to all the moderately poor could reduce child labor supply and increase the wages earned by 
children at work, by a double-digit magnitude. The incremental increase in child earnings indirectly 
benefits poor households that keep their children at work and thus improves contemporaneous poverty 
and income distribution indicators to a greater extent than partial equilibrium analysis suggests. While a 
partial equilibrium analysis suggests that the program extension would lead to a 1.8 percentage point 
contemporaneous decrease in poverty, the poverty-reducing effect of Oportunidades reaches 2.7 
percentage points once the general equilibrium effects are also taken into account.  
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Our estimates imply that it would be advisable for the Mexican government to extend the program, given 
that this would lead to a substantial improvement in school attendance and a reduction in poverty at only a 
moderate cost in terms of public expenditure. We also find that an increase in the skills of the future 
workforce, generated by lagged human capital acquisition through the existing Oportunidades program, 
could increase the future incomes of poor households, reducing the poverty rate by approximately 1.4 
percentage points in the long term. By including not only the Oportunidades transfers, but also overall 
household income as determinants of child labor supply in our model, our results suggest that for fighting 
the worst forms of child labor, policy makers need to adopt integrated responses that include social 
protection as well as jobs and decent work for parents that help to keep girls and boys in school, which is 
in line with the ILO Convention 182 (ILO 1999).  
While advantageous in various ways, the combined model has three serious limitations that future 
research could overcome. First, the model is static and, as such, does not allow us to trace the time path of 
the income changes triggered by the program and the corresponding changes in lifetime income. Second, 
our model does not provide a cost estimate of the additional expenses the government would have to take 
into consideration so to maintain educational quality in the Mexican society if intending to roll out the 
existing program. Third, the microsimulation model does not capture existing intrahousehold 
decisionmaking mechanisms that are potentially important in the determination of children’s time 
allocation and indirectly in determining the distributional effects of the program.  
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